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ABSTRACT 
Corporate mergers and acquisition has become a highly popular strategy in recent years. Thus, much attention has been 
focused on its outcomes. It has served as a substitute for innovation, a greater means of diversification. The banking 
sector is often referred to as an engine growth of the economy. The intermediation role which the sector plays in national 
development cannot be overemphasized. Thus, given the recent consolidation exercise in the Nigerian banking sector, we 
explored the impact of mergers and acquisition on managerial commitment in this paper.  We adopted the descriptive 
survey method and primary data were obtained using oral interview and questionnaire. The population of this study 
comprised all consolidated banks in Nigeria and the total sample size for this study was 384 respondents from commercial 
banks in South East Nigeria. The Chi-square (X
2
) non-parametric statistic was used to test the hypotheses. The results 
revealed that mergers and acquisitions have significant positive effect on managerial role and commitment of managers of 
commercial banks in Nigeria’s South East Region. We, therefore, recommend that incentive measures such as improved 
pay and good working environment should be promoted in commercial banks during mergers and acquisitions as these 
will further enhance managerial commitment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, a lot of research has been devoted to whether managerial commitment is enhanced through 
mergers and acquisitions. Literature examined suggests that there is a substantial potential for improvements in 
management of financial institutions from mergers and acquisitions. Most recent analyses find unexploited economies of 
scale even for fairly large entities in the US (Berger and Mester, 1997; Berger and Humphrey, 1997) and in Europe (Allen 
and Rai, 1996; Molyneux et al, 1996; Vander, 2001).  
Literature again suggests that the prospects for scale efficiency gains appear to be greater in the 1990s than in the 1980s 
with findings usually ascribed to technological progress and regulatory changes (Berger, et. al., 1999). Yet, a lot of studies 
conclude that the potential gains are seldom realized. Studies on mergers find little or no improvements in management 
efficiency on average (DeYoung, 1997; Peristiani, 1996; Berger, 1998). It appears therefore that, the potential gains from 
consolidating operations may have been offset by managerial inefficiencies or problems in integrating systems.  
Case study evidence suggests that the efficiency effects of mergers and acquisition may depend on the motivation behind 
the mergers process (Rhoades, 1998). Haynes and Thompson (1999) had explored the productivity effects of acquisitions 
for a panel of 93 UK building societies over the period 1981-1993 with results indicating significant and substantial 
productivity gains following acquisition. Through, these gains were not found to have resulted from economies of scale, 
there were nevertheless found to be consistent with a merger processes in which assets are transferred to the control of 
more productive managements. These results contrasted with much of existing merger literature. 
Mergers and acquisitions recently have become a highly popular restructuring strategy all around the world. Thus, much 
attention has been focused on its outcomes. Specifically, the extent mergers and acquisitions serves as a substitute for 
innovation, energy and attention required during negotiations, increased use of leverage, increased size, and the greater 
diversification may have on managers' risk orientations. Because of these effects, managers may reduce their 
commitment to innovation (Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland, 1990). 
In Nigeria, mergers and acquisitions became more popular during the 2005 consolidation exercise of banks. The primary 
objective according to the then Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria Soludo, for the government induced mergers and 
acquisition was to guarantee an efficient and sound financial system and as such the reform was designed to enable the 
banking system develop the required resilience to support the economic development of the nation by efficiently 
performing its functions as the fulcrum of financial intermediation through strong management commitment (Lemo, 2005). 
Thus, the reforms were designed at ensuring the safety of depositors’ money as well positioning banks to play active 
developmental roles in the Nigerian economy. 
The banking sector is often referred to as an engine of growth of the economy. The intermediation role which the sector 
plays in national development cannot be overemphasized. Managerial commitment is thus vital for the success of this 
important sector of the Nigerian economy. It is against the importance of the banking sector that we explored the impact of 
mergers and acquisitions on managerial commitment in the Nigerian banking industry. Our paper is subsequently divided 
into five sections. Section one is the introduction. In section two, we reviewed related literature. Section three contains our 
methodology, while section four discusses the results of our findings. Lastly, in section five, we provided recommendations 
based on evidence, inclusive of our conclusion. 
2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Managers may be able to pursue their own objectives in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions, particularly where 
corporate control may be relatively weak. One managerial objective may be empire-building. Executive compensation 
tends to increase with firm size, so managers may hope to achieve personal financial gains by engaging in M&As, 
although at least in part, the higher observed compensation of the managers of larger institutions rewards greater skill and 
effort. To protect their firm-specific human capital, some managers may also attempt to reduce insolvency risk below the 
level that is in shareholders’ interest, perhaps by diversifying risk through M&A activity.  
There is evidence that banking organizations may overpay for acquisitions when corporate governance structures are not 
sufficiently well-designed to align managerial incentives with those of owners. For example, banks that have addressed 
managerial agency problems through high levels of managerial shareholdings and/or concentrated ownership experience 
higher (or less negative) abnormal returns when they become acquirers than banks that have not addressed these agency 
conflicts as well. In addition, abnormal returns at bidder banks are increasing in the sensitivity of the CEO’s pay to the 
performance of the firm and to the share of outsiders on the board of directors (Allen and Rai, 1996; Cornett and 
Tehranian, 1992). This evidence suggests that entrenched managers with little pay sensitivity to performance or outside 
directors may make acquisitions that do not maximize shareholder wealth. 
Managerial entrenchment may also prevent some value maximizing M&As. This is possible by reducing the willingness of 
some financial institutions to become targets of M&As. One study found that banks in which managers hold a greater 
share of the stock are less likely to be acquired and that this effect is much larger at banks where management leaves 
following an acquisition (Houston, James and Ryngaert, 2001). This is consistent with the idea that management teams 
with large ownership stakes can be a hindrance and can, in fact block outside acquisition.  
In modelling overconfidence in the simplest possible way, Milbourn et al (1999) assume that there is a fraction of CEOs in 
the overall sample of CEOs who are overconfident in the sense that they overestimate the probability of success while 
managing a larger bank. That is, the probability of success enjoyed by a talented CEO managing a large size bank is 
assessed to be higher by an overconfident CEO than by a rational CEO. They also assume that overconfident CEOs know 
ISSN 2278-5612 
778 | P a g e          O c t o b e r ,  2 0 1 3  
that the rest of the market assesses a lower success probability in managing a large size bank.. They also observe that 
overconfident and rational CEOs are equally valuable to the firm in terms of their ability to produce successful outcomes 
and that CEO wages are reputation-dependent. 
In their study Milbourn, et. al. (1999) concludes that the larger asset base leads to a lower probability of success and the 
idea is that it is generally more difficult to manage a larger bank. This is a natural assumption. There is no doubt that 
managing a larger firm requires confronting more serious agency problems that call for greater coordination skills. Greater 
size also forces the CEO to make difficult decisions regarding resource allocation that are linked to a single corporate 
vision and a strategy that is integrated across the various units of the larger firm.   
Acquisitive growth has become a highly popular strategy in recent years. Thus, more attention has been focused on its 
outcomes. Specifically, the extent acquisitions serve as a substitute for innovation, energy and attention required during 
negotiations, increased use of leverage, increased size, and greater diversification may affect managers' risk orientations. 
Because of these effects, managers may reduce their commitment to innovation. The implications of the relationships 
specified in the model are also examined (Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland, 1990). 
Another direct effect is the amount of managerial energy absorbed by the acquisition process. Such absorption results in a 
lower propensity for other managers within the firm to pursue risky projects that require the support of top-level managers 
whose energies are directed primarily toward the acquisition process. A third direct effect is the increased debt levels that 
often are necessary to finance acquisitive growth (Michel and Shaked, 1985). As debt-holders gain power relative to other 
stakeholders, the acceptability of pursuing risky projects may decrease. This outcome may occur because debt holders 
are usually more risk averse than equity or stockholders (Smith and Warner, 1979; Williamson, 1988). 
There are also certain attributes of a firm that tend to change when a merger or an acquisition is completed. These 
attributes, which affect managerial commitment to innovation, are related to the way the newly combined firm is managed. 
Included among these attributes are firm size level of diversification, and the organizational control systems that they 
produce. Almost by definition, firms pursuing growth through acquisitions become larger and the range of their operations 
may become more diversified. In turn, increasing size and diversification affect the types of control systems that are used 
within the acquiring firm following an acquisition. For instance if, through acquisitions, a firm continues to diversify beyond 
its center of gravity  or beyond the ability of its managers to control the firm's operations, the indirect result may be loss of 
strategic control (Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986; Hill and Hoskisson, 1987). 
That is, managers may find that they are attempting to compete in a business that they do not understand fully. 
Furthermore, managers may find their ability to manage is bounded by the information-processing requirements in the 
firm's new competitive markets. In such instances, managers may substitute financial evaluation criteria for strategic 
criteria. These substitutions occur because managers may not have the expertise required to process richer strategic 
information (financial criteria require less information processing). Acquisitive growth may also increase firm size to a level 
that necessitates reliance on more formalized, bureaucratic controls (Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland, 1990). 
In the popular business literature it is argued that often, after acquisitions, resources allocated to an acquired firm's 
research and development projects are reduced or, in some cases, eliminated (Siwolop, 1987). Proponents of this view 
suggest that these actions are taken partially because of trade-offs that occur. For example, acquisitions may serve as a 
substitute for innovation. Additionally, investment in R&D may be reduced in order to increase short-term profits to pay for 
debts and related costs incurred in completing an acquisition (Clark and Malabre, 1988). 
Perceived risk affects the relationship between acquisitive growth and commitment to innovation. Internal development 
may be perceived by managers to entail high risk because of the low probability of innovation success and the length of 
time required for innovation to provide adequate returns (Clark and Malabre, 1988; Biggadike, 1979). It has been found, 
that for example, that new ventures require an average of 8 years to achieve profitability and 12 years to generate 
adequate cash flows leading to the conclusion that new internal ventures were very risky (Biggadike, 1979),   
Mansfield (1969) and Hill and Snell (1989) agree with the high risk of internal development because of the large failure 
rate of innovations. Mansfield (1969) estimated that up to 88 percent of innovations fail to achieve adequate returns on 
investment. Consistent with this position, Hill and Snell argue that although innovation was in the best interests of, and 
preferred by, stockholders, managers bear the consequences of its failure. Thus, top-level managers prefer to invest fewer 
resources in internal development (e.g. R&D) when faced with resource constraints or when other attractive investment 
alternatives exist. 
Acquisitions may serve as an attractive alternative to investment in R&D because they offer immediate entrance to a new 
market and/or a larger share of a market served currently by the firm (Balakrishnan, 1988; Shelton, 1988). While risk does 
exist, the outcomes are more certain and can be estimated (or forecasted) more accurately with acquisitions than with 
internal development. Collier (1983) argues that acquisitions have become a common means of avoiding risky R&D 
expenditures.  
Burgelman (1986) suggests that firm growth and development can be achieved through either acquisitions or innovations. 
However, because of resource constraints, most firms emphasize one or the other approach. For example, acquisitions 
often require significant resource commitments resulting in fewer resources to invest in other strategies. Acquisitions may 
therefore, serve as a substitute for innovations, particularly when resources are inadequate to pursue both acquisitive 
growth and internal development strategies. Interestingly, once managers begin to purchase innovations by acquisition, 
their commitment to this approach tends to escalate over time because internal R&D competency is likely to be reduced. 
Again, this is especially true when resources are scarce (Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland, 1990).  
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Often the need for substantial resources to complete acquisitions requires that firms resort to the use of debt. As noted 
previously, firms may trade off payment of debt and debt costs for investments in R&D. This argument is supported in the 
empirical literature. Collier (1983), for example, concluded that diversification by acquisition diverts investments from 
internal development. Michel and Shaked (1985) found that firms acquiring an unrelated business employed more 
leverage than other types of firms. These firms increase diversification to reduce their business risk, but greater amounts 
of leverage increase financial risk. Thus, these firms often reduce costs to decrease their financial risk, thereby using the 
increased returns to pay debt costs and reduce overall debt. 
Mintzberg (1979) concludes that lack of capital and an avoidance of risk constitute major barriers to innovation. A lack of 
internal capital or access to increased equity capital forces firms to employ additional leverage. Williamson (1988) 
proposes that debt operates largely through a set of strict rules. He suggests that these rules impose higher costs for risky 
projects where the assets involved are not redeployable for other purposes. The creation of innovation through R&D 
involves assets that are largely non-redeployable, suggesting that such activity is unlikely to be financed with debt. Thus, 
there may be a preference to use debt to fund acquisitions rather than to support R&D activities. This tendency exists 
because of a perception of less risk with acquisitions and a belief that such resources are invested in assets that are, for 
the most part, redeployable. Thus, increased leverage is likely to lead to greater risk aversion. This conclusion is 
supported by Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989), who found a negative relationship between levels of long-term debt and 
R&D expenditures after adjusting for firm size. It appears, then, that increasing levels of debt may produce managerial risk 
aversion, and in turn, a reduced managerial commitment to innovation. 
Frequently, operations in target firms that are being pursued vigorously for acquisition operate in a state of virtual 
'suspended animation'. Daily operations continue in the target firm but decisions requiring long-term commitments are 
often postponed pending outcome of the merger. In fact, managers in the target firm generally are reluctant to make long-
term commitments of resources (e.g. R&D expenditures) unless they do so for defensive purposes (e.g. to reduce the 
firm's cash position, having the effect of making the firm less attractive as an acquisition candidate). Walsh (1989) and 
Hirsch (1986) argue that target firm managers involved in such deals often experience job loss and reputation 'wounds'. It 
is the process of acquisitions that creates a short-term perspective and heightened risk aversion among the top-level 
managers of both the acquiring and target firms.  
Once the merger is completed, the process of post-merger integration becomes critical (Shrivastava, 1986; Sales and 
Mirvis, 1998; lamount and Anderson, 1985). It has been estimated that almost one-half to two-thirds of all mergers simply 
do not work and that one-third of all merger failures are caused by faulty integrations (Sales and Mirvis, 1998). 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) conservatively estimate that one-third of all acquisitions completed in the 1960s and 
1970s have been divested. These facts suggest that, managers must devote time and energy to assimilate successfully 
an acquired firm hence once the acquisition has been completed successfully, and the merged firm’s integrated, effective 
management of the newly formed firm becomes critical. As a result, the effects of increased size and diversification 
become important issues for top-level managers. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
We adopted the descriptive survey method of research in this paper. For analyses, primary data were obtained through 
the survey method using oral interview and questionnaire. The population of this study comprised all consolidated banks in 
Nigeria. We conducted a pilot survey where 20 copies of the questionnaire were distributed twice to a random sample of 
individuals in listed banks, specifically to management and non-management staff of these Commercial Banks. The pilot 
survey was designed to assist in determining the sample size to be used in this study and test the reliability of the 
research instrument. To generate the p and q for the sample size formula, the participants in this pilot study were 
requested to give their general impression of the post-consolidation era. Fifty percent of the respondents returned positive 
rating, while 50% gave negative rating. There were no undecided cases.  
Since it is was impossible to reach the entire population, we used the Freud and Williams formula as cited in Nwabuokei 
(2001) to determine the sample size of both management and non management staff (managers and non-managers) of 
these commercial banks.   
The Freund and Williams formula as cited in Nwabuokei (2001) is given as:  
  
    
  
 
where: 
 n = sample size 
 p = percentage of positive response  
 q = percentage of negative response  
 e = margin of error       
 Z = level of confidence 
From the result of the pilot study, the p (0.5) and the q (0.5) were generated. At  =0.05 (margin of error), Z = 1.96. Thus, 
we have: 
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Thus, the total sample size for this study was 384 respondents comprising 144 managerial staff and 240 non managerial 
staff of commercial banks in South East Nigeria. 
For the purpose of this study, we used the questionnaire as the major instrument for collection of primary data. We 
designed the questionnaire with structured questions. The questions structured using mainly 5-point Likert scale provided 
respondents with possible answers and asked that the respondents select those that apply. It should be noted that the 
structured questions were easier for the respondents to answer; and were more reliable because of the fixed presentation 
of questions and responses. The questionnaire gathered was used to analyze the data for ease of comprehension. 
Interview to key persons in the field was also conducted to have their impressions on the core issues in this paper. The 
responses were used to complement data generated from the questionnaire. For presentation and data analysis, tables 
and percentages were used to summarize the data gathered for clarity and comprehension while the Normal Distribution 
and Chi-square (X
2
) statistic were used to test the hypotheses 
4. PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
From the three hundred and eighty-four (384) copies of questionnaire distributed to managers and non-managers of 
commercial banks in South East Nigeria, a total of three hundred and twenty five (325) copies of the questionnaire were 
correctly filled and returned. Table 4.1 presents the response rate of questionnaire distributed. 
TABLE 4.1 Response Rates of Respondents  
Staff Copies  of 
Questionnaire 
Distributed 
Copies  of Questionnaire 
Returned 
Percentage 
Response (%) 
Managerial Staff 144 139 42 
Non Managerial Staff  240 186 58 
Total  384 325 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
The table 4.2 presents the responses from managerial and non-managerial staff based on managerial commitment of 
managers of commercial banks in Nigeria due to mergers and acquisition. 
Table 4.2 Response on Managerial Commitment of Managers 
Stakeholder Managers  Non-Managers Total % 
Strongly agree 45 61 106 33 
Agree 68 56 124 38 
Undecided 3 9 12 4 
Disagree 12 19 31 10 
Strongly disagree 11 41 52 15 
Total 139 186 325 100 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
Table 4.2 thus, depicts the consolidated responses for objective one of this study. It reveals that one hundred and six 
(106) respondents representing 33% of stakeholders strongly agreed mergers and acquisitions had significant positive 
effects on managerial commitment of managers of commercial banks in the South East region of Nigeria. A breakdown 
indicates that forty-five (45) of the respondents were managers of commercial banks and sixty-one (61) respondents were 
non-managers of commercial banks.  One hundred and twenty-four (124) respondents representing 38% of stakeholders 
agreed mergers and acquisitions had significant positive effects on managerial commitment of managers of commercial 
banks in the South East region of Nigeria. A breakdown of this indicates that sixty-eight (68) of the respondents were 
managers of commercial banks and fifty-six (56) respondents were non-managers of commercial banks. Twelve (12) 
respondents, representing 4% of stakeholders, were undecided that mergers and acquisitions had significant positive 
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effects on managerial commitment of managers of commercial banks in the South East region of Nigeria. A breakdown 
indicates that three (3) respondents were manager of a commercial bank and nine (9) respondents were non-managers of 
commercial banks.  
Thirty-one (31) respondents, representing 10% of stakeholders, disagreed that mergers and acquisitions had significant 
positive effects on managerial commitment of managers of commercial banks in the South East region of Nigeria. A 
breakdown of this indicates that twelve (12) of the respondents were managers of commercial banks and nineteen (19) 
respondents were non-managers of commercial banks. Lastly, fifty-two (52) respondents representing 15% of 
stakeholders strongly disagreed that mergers and acquisitions had significant positive effects on managerial commitment 
of managers of commercial banks in the South East region of Nigeria. A breakdown indicates that eleven (11) of the 
respondents were managers of commercial banks and forty-one (41) respondents were non-managers of commercial 
banks.  
From the personal interview carried out, respondents strongly agree that mergers and acquisitions had significant positive 
effects on managerial commitment of managers of commercial banks in the South East region of Nigeria. Stakeholders 
generally agreed that the positive significant effect was due to changes in managerial personnel of commercial banks. 
This induced a renewed sense of commitment to roles and realignment to the achievement of the vision of these banks in 
providing the necessary environment that will facilitate the intermediation function of Nigerian’s commercial banks in line 
with the objectives of the Central Bank of Nigeria consolidation policy. 
Test of Hypothesis 
The hypothesis stated was tested using three steps. Step one involved the restatement of the hypotheses in null and 
alternate forms. Step two incorporates presentation of table for analysis and analysis of SPSS results while step three 
involved decision.   
Step One: Restatement of Hypothesis in Null and Alternate forms 
Ho: Mergers and acquisitions have no significant positive effect on managerial commitment of Nigerian 
commercial banks in South East Region of Nigeria 
Ha: Mergers and acquisitions have significant positive effect on managerial commitment in Nigerian 
commercial banks in South East Region of Nigeria 
Step Two: Presentation of Table and Analysis of SPSS Results 
Recall that table 4.2 contains the responses from managers and non-managers. Information from the table are used to 
test our hypothesis stated in stage one. The results of the test are presented in table 4.3.  
Table 4.3:  SPSS Chi-Square Tests Result for Hypothesis One 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 70.981(a) 12 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 66.428 12 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
28.336 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 325   
Source: SPSS Results  
From table 4.3, stakeholders’ (managers and non managers in Nigeria’s South East region) perception from the results 
show that the mergers and acquisitions had significant positive effect on managerial commitment of managers of Nigerian 
commercial banks (Xc
2
 = 70.98 > Xt
2
 = 21.0 at 12 degrees of freedom and 0.05 level of significance).  
Step Three: Decision 
The null hypothesis is rejected while the alternate hypothesis is accepted. Thus, bank mergers and acquisitions had 
significant positive effect on managerial commitment of managers of commercial banks in Nigeria’s South East Region 
within the period studied.  
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
Managers may be able to pursue their own objectives in consolidation decisions, particularly in banking where corporate 
control may be relatively weak. One managerial objective may be empire-building. Executive compensation tends to 
increase with firm size, so managers may hope to achieve personal financial gains by engaging in M&As, although, at 
least in part, the higher observed compensation of the managers of larger institutions rewards greater skill and effort. To 
protect their firm-specific human capital, some managers attempt to reduce insolvency risk that is in shareholders’ interest, 
perhaps by diversifying risk through M&A activity. There is evidence that banking organizations may overpay for 
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acquisitions when corporate governance structures are not sufficiently well-designed to align managerial incentives with 
those of owners. For example, banks that have addressed managerial agency problems through high levels of managerial 
shareholdings and/or concentrated ownership experience higher (or less negative) abnormal returns when they become 
acquirers than banks that have not addressed these agency conflicts as well. This suggests that managers are more 
sensitivity to performance during periods of consolidation. This implies that managerial role and commitment are 
significantly and positive enhanced after M&A. The results of this study that bank consolidation have significant and 
positive effect on managerial role and commitment of commercial banks managers in Nigeria’s South East region are in 
line with research findings of Allen and Gale (2000) and Cornett and Tehranian (1992). 
One of the advantages of the banking sector consolidation that is often harped on is its potential for firms in the industry to 
enjoy economies of scale. Another issue related to the small size of Nigerian banks is the high cost of intermediation 
epitomized by the wide spread between deposit and lending rates. It would be recalled that the desire of the government 
to have a single digit lending rate has remained a mirage due, mainly, to the high cost of intermediation. Globally, size has 
become an ingredient for success. An enhanced capital-base, all things being equal, is expected to confer competitive 
edge on a bank and this obviously will require a high sense of commitment from managers of these deposit money banks 
especially given the volatile nature of the region. This study therefore, recommends that incentive measures such as high 
pay, good working environment should be provided during M&As in respect of commercial banks as they will further 
enhance managerial commitments. 
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